Casenotes: Contracts — Damages — Government Procurement — Government Not Liable for Impact Damages Suffered in the Performance of a Subsequent Contract Allegedly Caused by Constructive Changes to a Prior Contract. General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 585 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl. 1978) by Gorman, Francis John
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 9
Issue 1 Fall 1979 Article 11
1979
Casenotes: Contracts — Damages —
Government Procurement — Government Not
Liable for Impact Damages Suffered in the
Performance of a Subsequent Contract Allegedly
Caused by Constructive Changes to a Prior
Contract. General Dynamics Corp. v. United States,
585 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
Francis John Gorman
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gorman, Francis John (1979) "Casenotes: Contracts — Damages — Government Procurement — Government Not Liable for
Impact Damages Suffered in the Performance of a Subsequent Contract Allegedly Caused by Constructive Changes to a Prior
Contract. General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 585 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl. 1978)," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 9: Iss. 1,
Article 11.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol9/iss1/11
CONTRACTS - DAMAGES - GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
- GOVERNMENT NOT LIABLE FOR IMPACT DAMAGES 
SUFFERED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF A SUBSEQUENT 
CONTRACT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY CONSTRUCTIVE 
CHANGES TO A PRIOR CONTRACT. GENERAL DYNAMICS 
CORP. v. UNITED STATES, 585 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl. 1978). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In General Dynamics Corp. u. United States,! the United States 
Court of Claims considered a government contractor's claim for 
impact damages and rendered an opinion creating as many 
questions as it answers. In the context of government contracting, 
the Court of Claims defined impact damages in multiple-contract 
circumstances as "the extra cost in performing one contract, caused 
by the government doing things it has a right to do, respecting other 
contracts."2 The court reviewed prior cases in which impact damages 
have been granted in situations involving more than one contract 
and, drawing on those cases, outlined the requirements that will 
have to be present for future relief. A major conclusion of the opinion 
was that contractors' claims for impact damages in multiple-
contract situations will not be recognized except under "exceptional 
circumstances."3 Another significant holding in General Dynamics 
was that even extensive change ordered by the government to a 
complicated weapons contract or a contract for a technologically 
sophisticated product will not constitute a cardinal change or breach 
of that contract.4 
II. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
During the early 1960's, the United States Navy awarded several 
contracts for the construction of nuclear submarines. One of these 
contracts, encompassing three submarines, was awarded to General 
Dynamics Corporation.5 Two other contracts, for one submarine 
each, were awarded to Bethlehem Steel Company's Quincy, Massa-
chusetts shipyard.6 During the early stages of construction on 
General Dynamics' three submarines, and before any construction 
1. 585 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl. 1978). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 466. 
4. Id. at 463. 
5. Id. at 459. 
6. Id. Bethlehem had no experience in submarine construction. The government 
awarded it the contracts in order to increase the number of submarine 
construction facilities. Normally, contracts are awarded by the government on a 
strictly competitive basis. Here, however, the Navy invoked a national security 
rationale to award Bethlehem these two contracts despite the fact that 
Bethlehem was not the low bidder. There was a substantial difference in price 
between General Dynamics' contract for three submarines ($59,862,606) and 
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on Bethlehem's two submarines began, the Navy's lead, or model, 
ship for these new submarines, the U.S.S. Thresher, sank off the 
coast of New Hampshire.7 Although the exact cause of the accident 
was never determined, it was assumed that the cause of the accident 
was design related.s Consequently, to preclude further disasters, the 
Navy embarked on an extensive submarine redesign program given 
the name "Subsafe."9 It was the "Subsafe" program and its effect on 
General Dynamics' building program that led to General Dynamics' 
claim for damages. 
Eight months after the Thresher incident, and several months 
after all of the submarine builders were aware that design changes 
probably would be required by the Navy, Bethlehem closed its 
Quincy shipbuilding Yard. 1o At that time, Bethlehem had not yet 
begun construction on its two submarines, even though the contracts 
were almost two years oldY Partially because the "Subsafe" 
program was causing a backlog of work at its Groton, Connecticut 
shipyard, General Dynamics purchased the Quincy yard from 
Bethlehem.12 In a separate contract, General Dynamics, Bethlehem, 
and the Navy agreed that General Dynamics would assume 
Bethlehem's two submarine construction contracts.13 The Navy's 
original contract with Bethlehem had contained a provision against 
assignment; thus, as consideration for the Navy's waiver of its 
rights against assignment, General Dynamics and Bethlehem 
agreed to be bound by the standard government novation clause. As 
it appeared in the contract, the novation clause read: 
Bethlehem's contracts for one submarine each ($28,456,000 and $33,500,000). One 
of the reasons for the higher costs of construction for Bethlehem was that it had 
never built a submarine before this, and consequently would have had start-up 
costs and higher labor costs. On the other hand, General Dynamics had long 
been in the submarine construction business and could take advantage of 
economies of scale. See generally General Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 13885, 
73-2 B.C.A. 1/10,160 (May 15, 1973). 
7. Plaintiffs Request for Review Pursuant to Rule 54(b)(3) at 6; 585 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl. 
1978). 
8. 585 F.2d at 459-60. 
9. Id. Because at the time of the initiation of "Subsafe" the cause of the Thresher 
loss was unknown, the redesign program encompassed every structural 
modification that could have led to the accident. 
10. Id. at 459. The builders were of course aware of the accident from the extensive 
press coverage at the time, and were aware that one of the speculated causes of 
the sinking was design defects. The Navy inquiry centered largely around 
design, and the builders were active participants in these discussions. 
11. Id. It is not clear why construction had not begun, but the delay was assuredly 
caused, in part, by Bethlehem's reluctance to initiate performance on these 
contracts which would have been costly and financially damaging to the already 
weakened corporation. See generally General Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 
13885, 73-2 B.C.A. 1/10,160 (May 15, 1973) at 47,782. 
12. 585 F.2d at 459-60. 
13. Id. at 459. 
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The Transferor [Bethlehem] and the Transferee [General 
Dynamics] hereby agree that the Government shall not be 
obligated to payor reimburse either of them for, or otherwise 
give effect to, any costs, taxes or other expenses, or any 
increases therein, directly or indirectly arising out of or 
resulting from (i) said assignment, conveyance and transfer, 
or (ii) this Agreement, other than those which the Govern-
ment, in the Absence of said assignment, conveyance and 
transfer, or this Agreement, would have been obligated to 
payor reimburse under the terms of the Contracts. 14 
The first significant "Subsafe" change ordered by the Navy was 
the requirement that the hulls of the ships be lengthened by 
inserting an additional section.15 General Dynamics realized that its 
Groton shipyard would be unable to accomplish this work in a 
timely fashion because other contracts were backed up at Groton. IS 
General Dynamics therefore proposed to the Navy that two of the 
three Groton submarines be launched and towed to its newly 
acquired Quincy yard for hull lengthening. General Dynamics 
informed the Navy that, because of the light work load at Quincy, 
the submarines could be given top priority there. 17 In order to 
expedite delivery, the Navy gave its approval.18 General Dynamics 
never mentioned the existing Quincy ships in its transfer discus-
sions with the Navy and never detailed any of its construction 
plans.19 
"Subsafe" affected many aspects of design; as each problem was 
resolved by design engineers, the government issued change orders 
to the builders in piecemeal fashion.20 A few months after 
transferring the Groton ships to Quincy, General Dynamics realized 
that, although "Subsafe" was a year old, the program was complete 
in general terms only and that many important details were yet to be 
resolved.21 As each "Subsafe" change developed, the Navy and 
General Dynamics adjusted the submarine delivery dates to 
accommodate the extra work required by the changes.22 These 
14. General Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 13885, 73-2 B.C.A. ~ 10,160 (May 15, 1973) 
at 47,782. . 
15. [d. at 47,784. This change was ordered in order to strengthen the hulls. 
16. 585 F.2d at 460. 
17. [d. 
18. [d. See also 73-2 B.C.A. ~ 10,160 (May 15, 1973) at 47,788-89. 
19. 585 F.2d at 461. 
20. See 73-2 B.C.A. ~ 10,160 (May 15, 1973) at 47,783-807 (outlining change order 
problems). 
21. [d. at 47,791. 
22. [d. at 47,783-807. To illustrate the extent of the uncertainty surrounding the 
"Subsafe" program, the following chart shows the number of times the parties 
agreed to extend the delivery date for each of the four submarines involved. It 
should be noted that only one extension of four months to each ship was 
attributable to delay caused by General Dynamics. The remainder of the 
extensions were to accommodate the Navy's changes. 
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change orders shifting delivery dates caused disruption of General 
Dynamics' construction schedule. 
The nature of the work force at Quincy exacerbated the 
scheduling problems caused by the "Subsafe" program. When 
General Dynamics acquired the Quincy yard and transferred its 
ships there from Groton, only a small number of skilled personnel 
were transferred from Groton to Quincy. General Dynamics rehired 
most of Bethlehem's old work force, although most of these 
employees were not skilled in submarine construction.23 The lack of 
adequate workmanship and frequent errors by the Quincy crew were 
well documented on each of the four ships constructed there.24 The 
two original Quincy ships suffered most in the hands of these 
inexperienced workers.25 As the Navy increased the pressure on 
General Dynamics to expedite delivery, the best available workers 
were assigned to the two ships scheduled for earliest delivery, which 
were the original Groton ships.26 Consequently, General Dynamics 
had to employ additional inexperienced workers to complete the 
original Quincy ships.27 General Dynamics contended that, when it 
transferred the Groton ships to Quincy, it had intended to take 
maximum advantage of the scheduled sequential delivery of the four 
ships by effecting a "rollover" of skilled craftsmen from one ship to 
another, rather than employing four separate crews.28 According to 
Groton (impacting) Q,uincy (impacted) 
Ship SSN SSN SSN SSN 
designation 614 615 638 649 
Original 
delivery date 2-9-64 6-9-64 7-30-65 6-66 
First amended 
date 5-15-65 7-15-65 5-30-66 12-26-66 
Second 8-15-65 10-15-65 8-31-66 2-25-67 
Third 11-15-65 1-15-66 10-26-66 6-3-67 
Fourth 1-8-66 3-12-66 1-26-67 7-3-67 
Fifth 3-8-66 5-12-66 2-11-67 11-3-67 
Sixth 5-15-66 7-16-66 3-11-67 2-24-68 
Seventh 8-6-66 10-8-66 7-11-67 9-68 
Eighth 2-25-67 11-5-66 10-7-67 
Ninth 5-25-67 5-20-67 5-68 
Tenth 7-5-67 
Actual 
delivery 11-16-67 1-25-68 10-27-68 3-15-68 
23. Id. at 47,805. 
24. Id. Specific examples were not provided in the record other than to indicate that 
many things had to be redone. 
25.Id. 
26.Id. 
27.Id. 
28. Piaintiffs Request for Review Pursuant to Rule 54(h)(3) at 8-9. General 
Dynamics claimed that "rollover" was a normal construction technique. In 
"rollover," a contractor who has similar products to deliver in sequence trains 
each employee to do a particular job. The employees then go from one item to the 
next and perform the same task picking up skill and speed as they progress. The 
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General Dynamics, this was its general custom, and, in addition, 
because of increased efficiency and decreased cost, General Dynam-
ics believed the Navy was chargeable with ensuring that this 
"rollover" could take place. General Dynamics claimed the pressure 
for expeditious delivery thwarted its "rollover" plan, resulting in 
higher construction costS.29 To the extent that General Dynamics 
ever actually implemented a "rollover," it had a very limited effect.30 
As a consequence of "Subsafe" and the setbacks caused by poor 
workmanship, the two original Groton ships, which were transferred 
to Quincy, were each delivered about three and one-half years later 
than originally scheduled, and the two Quincy ships were delivered 
about twenty-six months later than originally planned.31 Because of 
the increased cost of each contract, General Dynamics filed its claim 
for impact damages, computed as the cost of the construction of the 
Quincy submarines allegedly attributable to the massive changes 
ordered to the transferred Groton submarines. 
III. CLAIMS PROCEDURES 
Government contracts generally have several standard clauses 
that greatly affect the rights of the parties. Of these, two played a 
role in the outcome of General Dynamics - the "Changes" clause32 
and the "Disputes" clause.33 The "Changes" clause provides for 
equitable adjustment of claims arising specifically under the terms 
of the contract. The "Disputes" clause establishes the procedure to be 
followed by the contractor in seeking compensation. The "Disputes" 
clause applicable to General Dynamics' contracts required that 
disputes arising within the contract first be submitted to a 
theory is similar to the assembly line concept except that the employees move 
from item to item rather than the items moving to them. The entire point of this 
case is General Dynamics' contention that because of the quantity and 
unpredictability of the Navy's change orders pursuant to "Subsafe," General 
Dynamics was unable to implement its "rollover" plan. The problem was 
aggravated by the Navy's increasing emphasis on expediting delivery of all four 
ships. This led General Dynamics to hire unskilled labor to work on the impacted 
submarines (Quincy submarines) while the skilled workers remained on the 
impacting submarines (Groton submarines). According to General Dynamics, 
because the Navy promulgated orders that defeated the "rollover" schedule, the 
Navy should pay the cost of the additional labor. 
29. 73-2 B.C.A. 1110,160 at 47,789-90. 
30. Id. at 47,805-07. 
31. Id. at 47,792-96. 
32. For an example of "Changes" clause, see R. NASH, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT 
CHANGES at 20 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NASH]. 
33. The "Disputes'.' clause plays a significant role in determining which issues reach 
the Court of Claims for review. See generally J. McBRIDE & H. WACHTEL, 
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (1978) [hereinafter cited as McBRIDE & WACHTEL]' 
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government contracting officer for review.34 From an adverse 
finding by the contracting officer, the contractor could appeal to the 
applicable Board of Contract Appeals.35 For all military procurement 
disputes, as in General Dynamics' case, the appropriate board was 
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA). Following 
these administrative steps, the contractor's access to the courts for 
review of disputes is limited.36 Claims arising outside of the contract, 
which are breach claims, were not covered by the "Disputes" clause 
procedures at the time of the General Dynamics decision.37 
Congress enacted the Wunderlich Act38 in 1954 in response to 
two United States Supreme Court decisions that gave a large 
measure of finality to findings of fact and law by government 
34. See Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U.S. 398, 401 (1878) (the purpose of the 
"Disputes" clause is to provide a quick, effective administrative remedy and to 
avoid "vexatious and expensive and, to the contractor oftentimes, ruinous 
litigation. "). 
35. There are eleven active Boards of Contract Appeals. When a contractor wishes to 
appeal a decision of a contracting officer, the appeal will either be entertained by 
the Board of the agency with which the contract has been made or, if the agency 
has no Board, the head of the agency will refer the case to one of the existing 
Boards. See Joseph, A Primer on Remedies, in RISKS AND REMEDIES IN 
GoVERNMENT CONTRACTING 31 (1974) (a conference sponsored by the A.B.A.); R. 
NASH & J. CIBNIC, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT 859-80 (2d ed. 1969). See also United 
States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1966) (Court of 
Claims has limited jurisdiction to review the Board's decisions of claims arising 
under the contract provisions). 
36. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1966). 
37. The Contracts Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978), 
modifies the procedural aspects of contract disputes significantly. The actual 
impact of the changes caused by this new act is unsettled and beyond the scope 
of this casenote. 
38. Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321, 322 (1976). 
The Wunderlich Act provided that administrative decisions were to be final 
only with respect to findings of fact. The two sections of the Wunderlich Act 
provide as follows: 
§ 321. Limitation on pleading contract-provisions relating to 
finality; standards of review. 
No provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating 
to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any 
department or agency 'or his duly authorized representative or board in a 
dispute involving a question arising under such contract, shall be 
pleaded in any suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial review of 
any such decision to cases where fraud by such' official or his said 
representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, that any such 
decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fraudulent or 
capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply 
bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence. 
§ 322. Contract-provisions making decisions final on questions of 
Law. 
No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a 
question of law the decision of any administrative official, representa-
tive, or board. 
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administrative Boards of Contract Appeals.39 The Wunderlich Act 
. provides that f'mdings of fact by Boards of Contract Appeals are 
given finality, unless they are judicially determined to be fraudulent, 
capricious, arbitrary, so grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith, or 
not supported by substantial evidence.4o Under the Act, findings of 
law by Boards of Contract Appeals are no longer given finality and 
are completely reviewable by the courts.41 Despite the passage of the 
Wunderlich Act, the Supreme Court has interpreted it so that review 
by the Court of Claims of a Board of Contract Appeals decision on 
an issue of law nonetheless remains limited in scope.42 
IV. THE GENERAL DYNAMICS DECISIONS 
A. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals Decision 
General Dynamics, pursuant to the "Disputes" clause in its 
assigned Quincy contract, filed a claim against the government for 
the increased costs of performance on the Quincy contracts.43 The 
thrust of the claim was that the "Subsafe" changes ordered by the 
Navy to the Groton ships were so extensive that they interfered 
with General Dynamics' planned personnel "rollover" from the 
Groton to the Quincy ships.44 This allegedly forced General 
Dynamics to use untrained and inadequate labor on the Quincy 
ships, resulting in higher construction costs. General Dynamics 
claimed that the changes to the Groton or "impacting" contract were 
so significant as to constitute a constructive change of the 
"impacted" or Quincy contract. 
A constructive change to a contract, as opposed to a cardinal 
change, is any act or requirement of the contracting agency, other 
than a formal change order as provided for by the contract, that 
requires the contractor to perform work different from that specified 
39. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951); United States v. Moorman, 338 
U.S. 457 (1950). The Court held in Moorman that administrative decisions in 
contracts disputes were "final and binding." 338 U.S. at 463. In Wunderlich, the 
Court further held that administrative decisions could be overturned by a court 
only if there were a determination of fraud in'the rendering of the administrative 
decision. 342 U.S. at 99. 
40. See note 38 supra. 
41. Id. 
42. See, e.g., S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1 (1972) (government 
has no right to appeal adverse decisions of boards of appeal); United States v. 
Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) (Board findings of fact are final 
in subsequent breach claims under the same contract); United States v. Carlo 
Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963) (review of board decisions is limited to the 
record); Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co. v. United States 499 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (the 
government may appeal only those aspects of the case that the contractor has 
appealed and is estopped from raising other issues). See also Pasley, The S & E 
Contractors Case-Beheading the Hydra or Wreaking Devasation?, 1973 DUKE 
L.J. 1. 
43. 585 F.2d at 460-61. 
44. Id. at 461. 
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under the original contract.45 A constructive change may entitle the 
contractor to price and performance adjustments. Unlike in a for-
mal change, however, in which the government admits responsibility 
for the cost and performance adjustment, the government does not 
always openly admit in a constructive change situation that the 
contractor is entitled to a revision of the contract terms.46 Construc-
tive changes typically come about informally or piecemeal, and the 
word "change" is not often used by the parties when a constructive 
change is occurring. Often, the parties do not recognize until after 
the fact that the contract has been changed to the extent that the 
contractor is entitled to additional compensation. Whether or not a 
constructive change entitles the contractor to equitable adjustment 
is a question of fact. A contractor, however, may not refuse to 
perform a change that amounts to a constructive change.47 
Unsettled claims for equitable adjustment arising from constructive 
changes are resolved pursuant to the "Disputes" clause of the 
contract.48 
A cardinal change, in distinction to a constructive change, is an 
order that, because of its scope, exceeds the changes permissable 
under a "Changes" clause and is considered a breach of the 
contract.49 Because a cardinal change constitutes a breach, a 
contractor may refuse to perform the change.50 The very magnitude 
of many government contracts causes difficulties in identifying 
when a specific change constitutes a breach and, worse yet for the 
contractor if he refuses to perform, whether the government may 
assert a breach.51 A contractor generally will perform a change that 
it believes is a cardinal change, but will reserve its right to litigate 
the alleged breach by notifying the contracting officer of its intent to 
seek relief. 52 Because a cardinal charge is a breach of the contract, 
the contract's "Changes" and "Disputes" clauses are inapplicable. 
General Dynamics could have pursued its breach claim directly in 
the Court of Claims without first resorting to formal administrative 
45. California Continuing Educ. of the Bar, BASIC TECHNIQUES OF PuBLIC 
CONTRACTS PRACTICE 90 (1977); NASH, supra note 32, at 203. Formal change 
orders typically are evidenced by written orders to modify the contract as 
originally written. Formal change orders are provided for by the contract in the 
"Changes" clause which specifies the procedures to be followed when ordering a 
change in the contract and also outlines the contract price and performance 
adjustment procedure to be followed by the parties. See note 33 supra. 
46. California Continuing Educ. of the Bar, BASIC TECHNIQUES OF PUBLIC 
CONTRACTS PRACTICE 90 (1977). 
47. Stoeckert v. United States, 391 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1968). 
48. See note 34 supra. 
49. California Continuing Educ. of the Bar, BASIC TECHNIQUES OF PUBLIC 
CONTRACTS PRACTICE 88 (1977). 
50. Gilbert W. Savage, ASBCA No. 11090, 66-2 B.C.A. ~ 5832 (1966). 
51. Axel Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 18990,74-1 B.C.A. ~ 10,471 (1974). 
52. California Continuing Educ. of the Bar, BASIC TECHNIQUES OF PUBLIC 
CONTRACTS PRACTICE 88 (1977). 
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procedures. 53 Unsure of whether its claim was a constructive change 
under the contract or a cardinal change, General Dynamics decided 
to pursue successive claims, first pursuing its administrative remedy 
for a constructive change with the Navy's contracting officer and 
then the ASBCA. If the administrative route proved unsuccessful, 
General Dynamics could then file a breach claim in the Court of 
Claims, and also appeal to that court the administrative decision on 
the constructive change claim. 
The Navy's contracting officer rejected the constructive change 
claim. General Dynamics appealed the adverse decision to the 
ASBCA on two alternative theories of recovery.54 General Dynamics 
first asserted that the changes ordered to the Groton submarines 
impacted the performance of the Quincy submarine contracts to the 
extent that the changes to the Groton contract constructively 
changed the Quincy contracts. This claim will be referred to as the 
multiple-contract impact claim. Second, General Dynamics asserted 
that the novation clause amounted to an amalgamation of the 
separate contracts into one entitling the contractor to equitable 
adjustment. This claim will be referred to as the one-contract impact 
claim. More substantial precedent exists for allowing one-contract 
claims than multiple-contract claims. 55 
The ASBCA findings of fact included a determination that there 
was no submarine construction plan at the time of the transfer, and 
therefore, that the Navy had no reason to know of any such plan. 
The Board also found that General Dynamics transferred the 
impacting ships for its own benefit to relieve congestion at Groton 
and that the damage claimed was the result of this transfer. General 
Dynamics was also charged with the knowledge that "subsafe" was 
forseeably complex and incomplete at the time of the transfer. The 
ASBCA additionally found that the Navy had not interfered in any 
way with General Dynamics' performance. 56 
On the issues of law with respect to the multiple-contract impact 
claim, the ASBCA held that the changes to the Groton (impacting) 
contract did not amount to a constructive change to the Quincy 
(impacted) contract, stating: 
53. Id. at 274. But see note 36 supra. The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 provides that 
all claims, including those for breach of contract based upon an alleged cardinal 
change, must be presented first to the contracting officer. Contractors are no 
longer able to raise breach claims initially in court. Contract Disputes Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563 §§ 6-8, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978). 
54. 73-2 B.CA ~ 10,160 (May 15, 1973) at 47,780. 
55. See, e.g., Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. United States, 429 F.2d 431, 432 (Ct. 
Cl. 1970), Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. United States, 406 F.2d 1357 (Ct. Cl. 1969). 
56. 73-2 B.CA ~ 10,160 (May 15, 1973) at 47,807-08. 
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Absent unusual and extreme factual circumstance, the 
ordinary rule is that the proper exercise of one's legal rights, 
such as [the Navy's] right to make changes under [the 
Groton contract], does not give rise to relief even when this 
lawful exercise of one person's right causes an economic loss 
to another.57 
According to the ASBCA, because the Groton contracts contained 
"Changes" clauses, the Navy was free to issue changes as necessary, 
provided that General Dynamics was equitably compensated as 
required by the "Changes" clause. The ASBCA also rejected General 
Dynamics' one-contract impact claim because the language of the 
novation clause released the Navy from any liability for costs 
arising from the contract assignment between Bethlehem and 
General Dynamics.58 The ASBCA did not directly answer the 
question whether the clause created a single new contract. 
B. The Court of Claims Decision 
General Dynamics appealed to the Court of Claims in two 
alternative counts. The first, a breach claim invoking the original 
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, alleged a cardinal change.59 In 
the second, General Dynamics requested Wunderlich review of the 
ASBCA decision, alleging that the Board's decision was not 
supported by substantial evidence. 60 . 
Generally, in determining whether a change is a cardinal 
change, the course of performance must be examined by measuring 
the number and quality of ordered changes and their effect on the 
entire contract. At a certain point, the extent of changes amounts to 
a breach.sl Under the facts of General Dynamics, however, the court 
held that this test was inapplicable. It reasoned that the nature of 
the goods contracted for - technologically sophisticated warships 
necessary to the national defense - and the recent U.S.S. Thresher 
tragedy, which demonstrated the necessity for design modifications, 
justified the changes so long as they did not constitute an abuse of 
governmental discretion. Inasmuch as no such abuse was found, the 
court granted summary judgment for the government on the 
cardinal change claim. 
57. Id. at 47.808. 
58. Id. at 47,809. See note 13 and accompanying text supra. 
59. 585 F.2d at 462. See also Plaintiff's Request for Review Pursuant to Rule 54(b)(3) 
at 2. 
60 .. 585 F.2d at 464. See also Plaintiff's Request for Review Pursuant to Rule 54(b)(3) 
at 2. 
61. 585 F.2d at 462. 
62. Id. at 464. In its decision, the court never clearly identified the counts in General 
Dynamics' claim. 
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In the Wunderlich review claim, General Dynamics alleged that 
the changes to the Groton contract amounted to a constructive 
change of the Quincy contract for which it should receive equitable 
adjustment.62 General Dynamics claimed that the ASBCA made 
errors of law in holding that the government was not liable for the 
increased costs of constructing the Quincy ships and that the 
novation agreement barred recovery of those increased costs. 
General Dynamics also alleged error in the ASBCA's findings that 
General Dynamics, by creating the situation resulting in the 
increased costs, assumed the risk of cost overruns, and that General 
Dynamics should not have relied on the government's representa-
tions in early 1964 that the "Subsafe" program was complete. Errors 
of mixed law and fact were alleged in the findings that the 
submarine "rollover" plan did not exist, that the Navy did not 
interfere with General Dynamics' planned performance, and that the 
Navy did not subordinate performance of the Quincy (impacted) 
contracts to the Groton (impacting) contract.63 
The Court of Claims held that, even accepting the existence of 
the alleged "rollover" plan, General Dynamics was not entitled to 
relief. 64 The court found, as had the ASBCA, that the "rollover" plan 
was never communicated to the Navy and that the Navy never 
performed any act acknowledging the existence of a construction 
plan.65 It also found that the Navy never waived its right to make 
changes as provided in the contracts. The government possessed a 
right to modify the contract unilaterally, and the Navy's approval of 
the transfer to Quincy, according to the court, neither expressly nor 
impliedly waived this right. Without addressing the issue of whether 
the novation clause created a single new contract, the court held that 
the Navy was liable only for normally compensable contract 
changes as set out in the "Changes" clause.66 In addition, the court 
stated that the manner of deployment of the available labor pool was 
entirely General Dynamics' decision. It also found that the Navy did 
not order any specific manner of utilizing the work force. While 
63. See Plaintiffs Request For Review Pursuant to Rule 54(b)(3) at 12-13. General 
Dynamics claimed that the following findings of fact by the ASBCA were 
actually issues of law or mixed fact and law: that General Dynamics created the 
impact by its assumption of the Quincy contracts and by the transfer of the 
Groton ships, thereby assuming the risk of increased costs; that General 
Dynamics could not reasonably have relied on assertions by the Navy in early 
1964 that the "Subsafe" program was complete; that General Dynamics had no 
"rollover" plan; that the Navy did not interfere with any plan; and that the Navy 
did not order General Dynamics to subordinate performance of the Quincy 
contracts to the Groton contract. See also Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment Pursuant to Trial Judge's Order Under Rule 165(b) at 6-8. 
64. 585 F.2d at 464. 
65. [d. 
66. [d. 
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acknowledging that when changes lead to disruption, extra work, or 
new procedures in performance, the contractor is entitled to 
equitable adjustment, the court severely limited such an adjustment 
in situations involving more than one contract.67 Prior case law 
granting equitable adjustment was referred to by the court, but in 
each such case relief had been sought upon a single contract.68 
Specifically, the court stated that had this been one contract instead 
of three, General Dynamics probably would have been able to obtain 
equitable adjustment.69 At this point, the court could have denied 
General Dynamics' relief on the second claim and concluded its 
opinion. 
The court further addressed the concept of impact damages in 
multiple-contract situations, however, and delineated in dicta the 
applicable criteria for relief in future multiple-contract impact dam-
ages claims.70 It stated that "exceptional circumstances" must be 
present to justify an equitable adjustment for increased costs in the 
performance of one contract caused by rightful government conduct 
under other contracts. The government's refusal to adjust the 
contract price must be inequitable to the contractor. The court 
outlined some situations in which relief might be warranted, such as 
when the government conceals facts from the contractor that are 
necessary to formulate costs, or intentionally hinders the contrac-
tor's performance, and "perhaps other instances where some degree 
of government culpability and 'proximate cause' exist."7l Because 
the actions of primary importance in General Dynamics (the 
novation, transfer, and use of the labor force) were found to be 
General Dynamics' own management choices and not caused by the 
67. Id. at 465. See, e.g., Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. United States, 429 F.2d 
431 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (unreasonable delay by Government causing contractor to 
encounter additional construction costs); Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. United States, 
406 F.2d 1357 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (contractor incurred additional labor costs in 
constructing a dam due to changed conditions). 
68. See note 55 supra. 
69. 585 F.2d at 465. 
70. Although the court never acknowledged the fact in its opinion, the claim for 
impact damages under circumstances involving separate contracts with the 
claim being made under the first contract was one of first impression. As 
discussed by the court in its opinion, most prior cases dealt with claims arising 
within one contract. Id. at 465-66. In United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61 (1942), 
the Supreme Court set the test for recovery for impact, delay, indirect, or ripple 
costs. The Court held that the government was required to adjust price only for 
the changed work and not for unchanged work. For a discussion of an 
alternative to this doctrine, see Roesler, Recovery of Impact Costs Under the Pre-
1968 Changed Conditions Clause, 31 FED. B.J. 327 (1972) (Under the test for 
recovery proposed in this article, General Dynamics might have recovered 
because the proposed standard does not require forseeability.). Since the 
modification of the "Changes" clause in 1968, the continued validity of the Rice 
criteria may be questionable. 
71. 585 F.2d at 466. 
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government, the court held that the multiple-contract impact criteria 
were not satisfied. 72 
The court concluded its opinion by returning to the novation 
clause, as had both the ASBCA and the trial judge. By its terms, the 
novation clause precluded government liability for costs arising 
directly or indirectly from the assignment of the Quincy contracts. 
Both of the lower decisions relied heavily upon this clause to deny 
relief by making their rulings on the effect of the novation 
agreement dispositive of the case. The Court of Claims, however, 
skirted General Dynamics' assertion that the novation created a 
single new contract. In fact, the import of the novation agreement 
was not addressed because the court found other grounds dispositive 
of the case.73 
V. ANALYSIS 
General Dynamics presented the Court of Claims with an 
opportunity to clarify the law of multiple-contract impact damage 
claims based upon constructive change. While the court did 
articulate a test - "exceptional circumstances" are required if such 
a claim is to be successful - that test is so imprecise that it offers 
little in the way of objective standards by which a contractor can 
ascertain whether the government's actions might make possible a 
viable multiple-contract impact claim. In applying this test to the 
General Dynamics facts, the court found that the requisite excep-
tional circumstances did not exist. Moreover, the court noted that the 
actions of General Dynamics itself contributed to the cost overruns.74 
Stated alternatively, the court did not find in General Dynamics the 
"government culpability and proximate cause" that had been 
present in prior cases in which multiple-contract impact damage 
claims had been successful. 
The Court of Claims did make clear, however, that changes to 
government weapon systems contracts and contracts for technologi-
cally sophisticated equipment can never amount to cardinal 
changes.75 In denying General Dynamics' claim, the court noted the 
calamitous nature of the Thresher incident and the relation of that 
incident to the safety of submarine crews and to the national 
interest.76 The court also noted that advanced submarine design is 
on the fringe of technological development and that a contractor 
could not, therefore, reasonably expect to complete a construction 
program without many changes reflecting technological break-
72.Id. 
73.Id. 
74. See note 66 and accompanying text supra. 
75. 585 F.2d at 462-64. 
76.Id. 
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throughs.77 The conclusion can thus be made that contracts to build 
combat ships, fighter planes, tanks, cannons, and perhaps even 
rifles might fall within the scope of the reasoning of the General 
Dynamics court. Conversely, it is also clear that contracts to produce 
non-dangerous objects of ordinary manufacture would be subject to 
cardinal changes.78 The problem with the court's rule, however, is 
that a clear line cannot be drawn between contracts that can be 
cardinally changed and those that can not. Defense materials 
contractors should realize that at any given moment an item 
destined for military use, no matter how mundane, could be vital. In 
such an instance, would the government escape liability for 
extensive changes to such contracts? The General Dynamics opinion 
does not answer this question. 
In disposing of the cardinal change claim, the Court of Claims 
provided possible criteria for the successful pursuit of such a claim. 79 
The court stated that the tests for cardinal change are the numbers 
of changes, the number of components changed and unchanged, the 
nature and timing of the changes, and the work necessary for the 
contractor to incorporate the changes.so The court implied that 
General Dynamics had satisfied these requirements, but failed 
nevertheless because of the nature of the object of the contract.81 
Cardinal change law therefore has been somewhat clarified. 
Contractors should look to the nature of the items being produced by 
them to determine whether the items may be of a nature that would 
allow changes amounting to a complete redesign not to be 
recognized as cardinal. Certainly, submarines fall within this 
class.82 
The court's decision on General Dynamics' constructive change 
claim appears to be result oriented. The dichotomy set up by the 
court between possible relief under one set of criteria in a single-
contract setting,83 and no relief under a different set of criteria in a 
multiple-contract setting,84 emphasizes form over substance. Mo-
reover, the Court of Claims told General Dynamics that its claim 
77. Id. at 463. 
78. Air-A-Plane Corp. v. United States, 408 F.2d 1030 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (this case, 
however, was settled, thus its precedential value is limited). See 585 F.2d at 
463-64. 
79. 585 F.2d at 462-64. 
BO. Id. See also Air-A-Plane Corp. v. United States, 408 F.2d 1030 (Ct. Cl. 1969). 
81. 585 F.2d at 462-63. 
82. Id. Accord, McCord v. United States, 9 Ct. Cl. 155 (1873), aff'd sub nom. 
Chouteau v. United States, 95 U.S. 61 (1877) (manufacturers of civil war 
Monitors held unable to assert a cardinal change no matter how extensive 
government changes may be). 
83. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra. 
84. See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra. 
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might have been successful had it been brought under one contract, 
but failed to rule on General Dynamics' claim that the novation 
merged the three contracts into one. Without resolution of that issue, 
General Dynamics was left with only its multiple-contract impact 
claim. The court applied different criteria to the multiple-contract 
impact claim, and held that General Dynamics did not satisfy those 
requirements. General Dynamics, therefore, was left with a wrong 
without a remedy. 
It is in the analysis of constructive change in multiple-contract 
impact claims that the General Dynamics opinion creates the most 
confusion. Even though the claim in General Dynamics was based 
upon contract law, the court's analysis was couched in terms of tort 
principles. Initially, the court examined the nature of the assent to 
transfer the submarines and construed its contractual effect in the 
Navy's favor. 85 This conclusion was based upon the general legal 
principle that the assent did not on its face purport to witness the 
Navy's deference to General Dynamics' labor plans, nor did it waive 
the Navy's right to make the extensive changes the court found 
permissable in its cardinal change analysis.86 In the remainder of its 
discussion, however, the court pointed out that it was General 
Dynamics that managed the work force. The blame, therefore, for 
costs attributable to work force utilization was solely the contrac-
tor's.87 This reasoning seems to stem from a proximate cause-
contributory negligence approach. What General Dynamics was 
seeking in its constructive change claim was an equitable adjust-
ment to the contract price. Equity requires that the contractor have 
clean hands. General Dynamics did not qualify because, even if the 
"Subsafe" changes affected its "rollover" plan, General Dynamics 
exacerbated those effects by its own poor management. In other 
words, General Dynamics' own management choices were the 
proximate cause of its damages. 
The court's approach to impact damages in multiple-contract 
situations has further basis in tort law. The court construed a 
number of prior cases in which claims were based upon changes 
of one contract impacting another.88 The court's conclusion, which 
appears sound, is that "only in exceptional circumstances can an 
equitable adjustment be made for extra cost in performing one 
contract, caused by the government doing things it has a right to do, 
85. 585 F.2d at 464. 
86.Id. 
87. Id. at 465. 
88. Id. at 465-66. See generally United States v. Beuttas, 324 U.S. 768 (1945); Allied 
Paint Mfg. Co. v. United States, 470 F.2d 556 (Ct. Cl. 1972); J.A. Jones Constr. 
Co. v. United States, 390 F.2d 886 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Amino Bros. Co. v. United 
States, 372 F.2d 485 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 846 (1967); Specialty 
Assembling & Packing Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 554 (Ct. Cl. 1966). 
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respecting other contracts."89 The examples set forth by the court all 
amount to conduct on the part of the government that is tantamount 
to malicious interference with the contractor's business. For 
example, equitable adjustment may be allowed were the government 
knowingly to withhold information from the contractor that the 
contractor needs to estimate his costs,90 or were the government 
knowingly ·and intentionally to hinder the contractor's perfor-
mance.91 Most interesting for future cases is the statement of the 
General Dynamics court in summary that the government would be 
liable were both government culpability and proximate cause to 
exist.92 Proximate cause is not a contract principle. Perhaps what 
the court said, in essence, is that in order for impact damages to be 
awarded in an equitable price adjustment, the government must 
commit a tort on the contractual relationship. This government 
wrong must be the proximate cause of the contractor's increased 
costs outside of the contract, and the contractor must do nothing 
that contributes to that increased cost. More simply stated, if the 
government commits an intentional tort, it may have a defense 
when the contractor is contributorily negligent. 
It appears that the court wanted to eliminate claims for impact 
damages, yet decided in light of prior cases93 to leave the door open 
ever so· slightly for a future plaintiff presenting a case with the 
proper facts. Slight changes in the facts might have resulted in 
General Dynamics prevailing on its claims. Had the Navy been 
informed of the "rollover" plans, General Dynamics might have met 
the "exceptional circumstances" test, inasmuch as change orders 
that disrupted that plan might have been viewed as tantamount to 
"government culpability and 'proximate cause.' "94 Similarly, were 
General Dynamics building cargo vessels of routine design, the 
cardinal change claim probably would have been successful. 
The decision of the ASBCA in Ingalls Shipbuilding Division, 
Litton Systems, Inc.,95 a companion case to General Dynamics that 
never reached the Court of Claims, highlights the iinportance of 
General Dynamics' "contributory negligence." Litton filed an impact 
damages claim for increased costs in performing seven contracts 
(five Navy surface, and fourteen commercial vessels) allegedly 
resulting from "Subsafe" changes of Litton's contracts to build three 
submarines.96 Litton claimed the increased costs were due to the 
89. 585 F.2d at 466. 
90. [d. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. 
93. See note 88 supra. 
94. 585 F.2d at 466. 
95. ASBCA No. 17579, 78-1 B.C.A. ~ 13,038 (February 17, 1978). 
96. [d. at 63,583. 
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Navy's insistence that it give priority to the construction of the 
submarines.97 Litton was decided by the ASBCA eight months 
before the Court of Claims issued its opinion in General Dynamics. 
In Litton, the plaintiff contractor did not make any claims under the 
"Changes" clause to its contract, which distinguishes the case at 
least superficially from General Dynamics.98 The ASBCA held for 
the contractor and awarded damages for an injury similar to that 
which General Dynamics had suffered. The ASBCA distinguished 
its decisions in Litton and General Dynamics on the grounds that 
General Dynamics had contributed to its own loss because of its 
management decision to move the ships. The Board also noted that 
in General Dynamics the plain language of the novation clause 
barred recovery.99 It is not clear whether the ASBCA decision in 
Litton is good law due to the subsequent Court of Claims decision in 
General Dynamics. It is interesting to note, however, that the 
ASBCA implies in clearer terms than the Court of Claims that 
General Dynamics came close to recovery. The Litton decision 
implies that the requisite government inequity was present in 
General Dynamics, but that the contractor's own mismanagement 
broke the chain of proximate cause. lOO 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In General Dynamics, the Court of Claims reached three major 
conclusions. With respect to cardinal change law, the court held that 
contracts for technologically sophisticated items, for items that can 
endanger human safety if poorly designed, and perhaps for weapons 
systems in general, can be modified extensively by the government 
without running the risk of committing a cardinal change. Under 
the category of constructive change, the court made two rulings. 
Regarding one-contract impact damage claims, the court reaffirmed 
prior case law by approving equitable adjustment of the contract 
price in such situations. It stated that General Dynamics might have 
97. Id. Litton filed its claim under the "Suspension of Work" clause in its contract as 
a constructive suspension of work. The difference between this clause and the 
changes clause is not relevant to this note. For additional information on 
"Suspension of Work" clauses, see California Continuing Educ. of the Bar, BASIC • 
TECHNIQUES OF PUBUC CONTRACTS PRACTICE 90 (1977). 
98. See note 49 and accompanying text supra. 
99. 78-1 B.C.A. ~ 13,038, at 63,659. 
100. See notes 86-92 and accompanying text supra. 
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been entitled to adjustment if its claim had been brought under a 
single contract. In multiple-contract cases, the court pulled together 
criteria that may be used to determine whether "exceptional 
circumstances" exist that justify recovery by the contractor. It held 
that General Dynamics did not have a cognizable claim under these 
multiple-contract criteria. In summary, the court implicitly found 
that General Dynamics was "wronged" in its contractual relation-
ship but could find no theory under which General Dynamics could 
obtain relief. 
Francis John Gorman 
